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''Stalin's Missed Chance'' is a study by Russian military historian Mikhail Ivanovich Meltyukhov, author of several books and articles on Soviet military history. ''Stalin's Missed Chance'' covers a theory of planned Soviet invasion raised by Viktor Suvorov, author of highly controversial books such as ''Icebreaker''. Unlike Suvorov's works, Meltyukhov's book is based on archive materials, some of which were until recently classified. Contrary to many Western scholars (David Glantz, John D. Erickson, Richard Overy and others), Mikhail Meltyukhov concurs with Suvorov's claim that Stalin and the Soviet military leadership had planned an offensive against Germany in 1941. Meltyukhov rejects, however, Suvorov's claims that the German assault (Operation Barbarossa) was a preemptive strike: Meltyukhov affirms both sides had been preparing to invade the other, but neither believed the possibility of the other side's strike. ''Stalin's Missed Chance'' is an extensive study of archive sources, often quoting and summarizing wartime records of the Red Army and the Soviet Union. The book also draws on a legion of published primary sources from the years 1939 to 1941. == On the eve of World War II == According to Meltyukhov, Russia had lost its position as a Great Power during the Great War, the revolution and the breakup of its empire. The Soviet leadership had the option either to accept the regional status of the USSR or to become a Great Power once again. Having decided for the latter, the Soviet leadership used Communist ideology (the Comintern, the idea of world revolution etc.) to strengthen its position.〔Meltyukhov 2000:491〕 The key objective was to exclude a possible alliance of Capitalist countries. Although diplomatic relationships had been established with the capitalist countries, the USSR was not accepted as an equal partner. That changed, however, in the course of the political crisis of 1939, when two military and political blocs were formed: Anglo-French and German-Italian, both of which were interested in an agreement with the USSR. Moscow then had the opportunity to choose with whom and under what conditions to negotiate. The basic aim was to retain neutrality, and after the weakening of both belligerent sides, to emerge as the decisive factor in ensuring victory for one side. Thus, "the USSR succeeded in staying out of the European war, after obtaining in this case a significant free hand in Eastern Europe, wider space to maneuver in its own interests between the belligerent sides."〔Meltyukhov 2000:491-2〕 During the years 1939 and 1940, the USSR annexed several Eastern European countries and territories. The Kremlin viewed Germany as a force capable of weakening the positions of the United Kingdom and shaking the capitalist order. And "then at the suitable moment the Red Army could have destroyed Germany and would have freed Europe both from fascism and from 'rotten capitalism.'"〔Meltyukhov 2000:492-4〕 As for Soviet-German relationship during 1940, Meltyukhov points out that although both sides had the common goal of weakening Britain and negotiations were held in November 1940, an actual military alliance was never realised, for Soviets would have had to leave the whole continent to the German-Italian sphere of influence, i.e., relegating the Soviets to a second-rate role in the world matters.〔Meltyukhov 2000:494〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Stalin's Missed Chance」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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